Abstract. Modern computer architectures share physical resources between different programs in order to increase area-, energy-, and costefficiency. Unfortunately, sharing often gives rise to side channels that can be exploited for extracting or transmitting sensitive information. We currently lack techniques for systematic reasoning about this interplay between security and efficiency. In particular, there is no established way for quantifying security properties of shared caches. In this paper, we propose a novel model that enables us to characterize important security properties of caches. Our model encompasses two aspects: (1) The amount of information that can be absorbed by a cache, and (2) the amount of information that can effectively be extracted from the cache by an adversary. We use our model to compute both quantities for common cache replacement policies (FIFO, LRU, and PLRU) and to compare their isolation properties. We further show how our model for information extraction leads to an algorithm that can be used to improve the bounds delivered by the CacheAudit static analyzer.
Introduction
Modern computer architectures share physical resources across different programs in order to increase area-, energy-, and cost-efficiency. Examples of commonly shared resources are caches, branch prediction units, DRAM, and disks.
Unfortunately, sharing poses a threat to security: even if programs are completely isolated on a logical level, sharing a physical resource usually means that one program's resource usage pattern can be observed by the other. This constitutes a channel that can be exploited for extracting or transmitting sensitive information. While this kind of vulnerability has been known for decades [13] , its severity has become painfully apparent with a stream of highly effective sidechannel attacks. One shared resource that has been the objective of a large number of attacks are CPU caches, e.g. [19, 6, 2, 3, 11, 23, 15] .
From a security point of view it would be ideal to completely eliminate side channels through the cache by design, as in [21, 24] , or to flush the cache between accesses of two different parties. Unfortunately, such conservative approaches also partially void the performance benefits of sharing. In many practical scenarios, designers will opt for less conservative solutions that offer "sufficient" degrees of security together with high performance. However, while there is a large body of work on evaluating the impact of different cache designs on performance, there are no established metrics for evaluating their security, which prevents principled decision-making in that design space.
Approach. In this paper, we address this problem by introducing a novel approach to quantify the security of caches, in particular: their replacement policies. Our approach aims to answer the following questions, which capture two natural aspects of isolation between programs that share the cache:
Q1 How much information about a computation is absorbed by the cache? There are two challenges involved with this question. The first is to identify a meaningful measure for the information contained in a given cache state. The second is to characterize the set of possible computations, which may induce different cache states. To make assertions about the security of the cache architecture (rather than about the security of a specific program running on top of a cache architecture) such a characterization needs to encompass a sufficiently general class of programs.
Q2 How much information can an adversary extract from the cache state? The challenge for answering this question is that an adversary can only learn about the cache state by probing, that is, by performing memory accesses and measuring their latency. However, probing also modifies the cache state and thus can reduce its information content. With the exception of one approach that encompasses secrets that change over time [16] , existing models of quantitative information flow do not account for this scenario because they either consider only single probes [20] or assume the secret remains unchanged by the probing [12, 7, 4] .
A1 For answering Q1, we characterize the absorbed information as the number of reachable cache states, which essentially captures the information that programs leak into the cache. For a single program, this amount can be bounded using existing static analysis tools [9] . For abstracting from a specific program, we draw inspiration from the working set model [8] and characterize programs in terms of their footprint, i.e., the number of memory blocks they use. We then show how (and under which assumptions) the footprint alone can be used to characterize the absorption of a given replacement policy, leading to a programindependent measure.
A2 For answering Q2, we put forward a novel model to quantify the "extractable" information about the cache state. We consider an adversary that adaptively provides inputs and observes the outputs. The key difference to existing models of adaptive attacks [12, 7] is that our model is based on a Mealy machine in which each input triggers a state transition, which may erase information about its origin. As in existing models, we first characterize the revealed information in terms of a partition of the set of secrets (here: initial states of the machine). We then evaluate this partition with established measures of leakage to quantify the corresponding amount of information. By considering the maximum leakage w.r.t. all possible inputs to the Mealy machine, we obtain an upper bound on the information that any adaptive adversary can extract. We present an algorithm that computes such bounds for given Mealy machines.
Results. We put our models and algorithms to work for the quantification of absorption and extraction properties of common cache replacement policies, namely FIFO, LRU, and PLRU. We highlight the following results; see the paper for more details.
-We show that the relative security ranking of cache replacement policies varies widely depending on the memory demand of the program. For example, FIFO can provide the best security when memory demand is low, whereas LRU generally provides the best security. Our results show that PLRU generally offers worse security than the other replacement policies. -We show that our algorithm for information extraction can be used for improving the cache-state counting of the CacheAudit static analyzer [9] . Our experimental results show that this significantly improves the bounds delivered by CacheAudit, leading to gains of up to 50 bits for AES 256.
Contribution. In summary, our conceptual contribution is to propose novel measures for quantifying isolation properties of shared caches. Our practical contribution is to perform the first security analysis of common cache replacement policies.
The Model

Caches as Mealy Machines
Caches are fast but small memories that store a subset of the main memory's contents to bridge the latency gap between the CPU and the main memory. To profit from spatial locality and to reduce management overhead, main memory is logically partitioned into a set B of memory blocks. Each block is cached as a whole in a cache line of the same size. When accessing a memory block, the cache logic has to determine whether the block is stored in the cache ("cache hit") or not ("cache miss").
In this paper, we model caches as Mealy machines, that is, finite automata that map sequences of accessed memory blocks to sequences of hits and misses. We begin by recalling the definition of a Mealy machine before we specialize it to the case of caches. Definition 1. A (deterministic) Mealy machine M is a five-tuple consisting of -S: a finite set of states, -Σ: a finite set of inputs, -O: a finite set of outputs (or observations), -upd : S × Σ → S: a transition function, and
For casting caches as Mealy machines, we use memory blocks as inputs, i.e. Σ = B, and cache hits (H) and misses (M) as observations, i.e., O = {H, M}.
For defining the set of states S, recall that caches are commonly partitioned into independent equally-sized cache sets whose size A is called the associativity of the cache. For each block there is a single cache set that stores it. For simplicity of presentation we focus on caches with a single set. Since cache sets behave independently from each other, the technique is generalizable to several sets by focusing each time on the blocks stored in a particular set. We model a cache set as a function that assigns an age in A := {0, . . . , A − 1, A} to each memory block.
Here, the youngest block has age 0 and the oldest cached block has age A − 1. Age A means that a block is not cached; it is the only age that can be shared by multiple blocks.
With this, the observation function view b = view (·, b) is naturally defined as
The transition function upd b = upd(·, b) is specified by:
This transition function models permutation replacement policies as defined in [1] . Upon a miss, c(b) = A, the accessed block is placed at the beginning of the cache, increasing the ages of younger blocks and evicting the block with age A−1. In the case of a hit, each replacement policy reorders the blocks in a certain way, determined by the permutation function Π α (α ′ ) : A → A; it modifies the current age α ′ of a block according to a base age α. We introduce the definition the three permutation functions following the model developed in [1] .
The FIFO (First In First Out) replacement policy does not change the ages of the blocks upon cache hits. It is is thus modeled as the identity permutation.
The LRU (Least Recently Used) replacement policy sets the age of an accessed block to 0 upon a cache hit, making sure that the least-recently-used blocks get evicted upon misses. Formally, we cast this behavior as The PLRU (Pseudo Least Recently Used) is similar to LRU, but with a more complex permutation function. For an associativity which is a power of two, PLRU represents each cache set as a full binary tree storing the blocks at its leaves, and each non-leaf stores a bit which represents an arrow pointing to one of the children. Upon a cache miss, the block to be evicted is determined by following the arrows starting from the root. Upon any cache access (regardless whether it is a hit or a miss), the arrows on the way to the accessed block are flipped. Figure 1 shows an example of two consecutive cache hits in a 4-way cache. In this paper we assume that the associativity is always a power of two.
We formally define this PLRU permutation policy Π PLRU as
Quantifying Absorption and Extraction
We characterize absorption and extraction in terms of the interactions of two agents, a victim and an adversary.
-The victim first chooses a secret, such as a cryptographic key. We model this using a random variable X. The victim then uses this secret as input to a program that he runs to completion (or preemption) on a platform with a cache. We capture the effect of the victim's computation on the cache state in terms of a finite sequence of blocks from the set of victim's blocks B v , where B v ⊆ B. The cache uses this sequence as inputs to transition from an initial state to the victim's state. We model the victim's state using a random variable Y v that takes values in a set S v ⊆ S, i.e. ran(Y v ) = S v .
-The adversary then runs a program on the same platform, which enables him to make observations about the state of the cache by measuring the latency of its memory accesses. 3 We model the adversary's actions in terms of a finite sequence of blocks from the subset of attacker's blocks B a ⊆ B. Using the sequence of blocks as inputs, the cache transitions from the victim's state returning a sequence of hits and misses that we model with the random variable Z a , ran(Z a ) ⊆ O * . We make the random variable dependent on the attacker since he can choose the sequence of blocks. Based on these observations, the adversary tries to guess the secret. We model the guess in terms of the random variableX. 4 We say that an attack is successful if the adversary correctly guesses the secret, i.e. if X =X.
We now give a high-level operational motivation for our definitions of information absorption and extraction, in terms of a bound on the probability of a successful attack. We assume that the distribution of each of these random variables depends only on the outcome of the previous one, i.e., that the distribution of cache states depends only on the secret, and that the adversary's observations depend only on the state of the cache. Then we can cast the dependencies between these random variables in terms of the following Markov chain:
The following result bounds the probability of a successful attack, i.e. P (X = X), in terms of the size of the ranges of Y v and Z a , respectively. Theorem 1.
Proof. The result is consequence of the fact that the reduction of min-entropy of X when observing a jointly distributed random variable is upper-bounded by the size of the range of that variable [20] . We cast this result in terms of Markov chain notation as in [9] , and apply it to both Y v and Z a .
⊓ ⊔
For an attacker that follows a deterministic strategy, the value of Z a is determined by the value of Y v . Therefore |ran(Z a )| ≤ |ran(Y v )|, which implies that (6) leads to better security guarantees than (7) . Whenever additionally the value of Y v is determined by that of X and X is uniformly distributed, the bounds given by Theorem 1 are tight, in the sense that they can be achieved by computationally unbounded adversaries.
In this paper, we will use |ran(Y v )| to capture the amount of information that is absorbed by the cache, and we will use |ran(Z a )| to capture the amount of information that the adversary can extract from the cache. The operational significance of these quantities follows from Theorem 1. We discuss how these quantities can be computed in Section 3 and 4, respectively. Before we give the formal definition we note that the absorbed information depends on two things: the initial state of the Mealy machine and the inputs of the victim. To see the effect of the initial state s 0 ∈ S, consider the Mealy machine in Figure 2 and assume that the victim may use any sequence of inputs from Σ * v = {a, b} * . If we start from the state s 0 = 1 only that one state is reachable, S v = {1}; if s 0 = 2, 3 then S v = {1, 2, 3} and finally if s 0 = 4 then S v = S.
Absorption of Information
We capture the victim's inputs as a trace t ∈ Σ * v . This leads to the following definition of |ran(Y v )|. 
In the above definition of absorption, the set of traces T is a parameter. For a given program, existing static analysis techniques can be used to compute approximations of the set of traces T and the induced absorption of a particular cache, modeled by a Mealy machine M . In Section 6 we present the results of a static analysis of two AES implementations.
In this section, our goal is to characterize the absorption properties of caches independently of a particular program. A worst case approach to this end is to study absorption under all possible traces T = B * v , given a set of memory blocks B v . For this, we first state several general results in Section 3.1, which show that the absorption of caches is independent of the particular set of memory blocks B v being accessed, and only depends on its size, |B v |. In Section 3.2, we then use these general results to derive concrete results on the absorption properties of caches under LRU, FIFO, and PLRU replacement.
Data Independence of Permutation Replacement Policies
Initial State Absorption, as defined in Definition 2 depends on the initial state of the Mealy machine. Considering programs that may access the set of memory blocks B ⊆ B, two types of initial states for caches are particularly interesting: The notions of empty and filled cache states are relative to a set of memory blocks. We will consider empty and filled cache states relative to the memory blocks accessed by the victim, B v . To conservatively capture the power of an attacker, ages without a victim's block mapped to them will be assumed to hold the attacker's memory blocks not accessible for the victim, that is, blocks from the set B a \ B v .
Data Independence
The following result is central for our program-independent analysis of cache replacement policies. It shows that absorption can be characterized independently of the particular set of blocks B that the victim may access: 
The proof of Theorem 2 follows from the following lemma and the observation that one can define bijections between all sets of equal cardinality.
Proof. For any state c and any blocks b, b
. This is because the transition functions of caches do not consider the block itself, they only perform equality checks or compare the ages. Since f is a bijection and c • f −1 (f (b)) = c(b) for all b, the output of the update functions coincides. Therefore, every update from c 0 with any trace of blocks b 1 . . . b n produces the same state as updating
We focus on filled and empty initial states since they represent the two extremes for the information absorption. Consider a partially filled state c, that is, where there is a sequence of distinct blocks b 0 . . . b n with n ≤ min(A, |B|−1) such that c(b i ) = i for i ≤ n. Then, any state reachable from c by inputting a trace t ∈ B * is reachable from an empty one c e with the trace t ′ = b n . . . b 0 t. Since c e is empty, we load the blocks b 0 . . . b n in reverse order; these access produce misses and so, after the updates, upd b0 · · · upd bn (c e )(b i ) = i, see (1) . Therefore Abs(M, c, B * ) ≤ Abs(M, c e , B * ). Using this argument we can see that, for the same set of memory blocks, the value of the absorbed information is the smallest when starting on a filled state and is the largest when starting on an empty state.
An important consequence of Theorem 2 is that, given an identical status, i.e. empty or filled, of the initial state, the amount of absorbed information depends only on the number of blocks in B v . We call this number the footprint and denote it by fp = |B v |. This terminology is loosely connected with the notion of a memory footprint as used in the theory of locality [22] . Theory of locality defines the footprint as the number of distinct memory blocks accessed during a time window, i.e. on a trace of a given length. In our case we consider this length to be unbounded so the trace is the whole execution of the program. This motivates the specialization of the definition of the absorbed information in terms of the footprint, namely
where we use the subscript x = e to denote that c 0 is empty w.r.t. B v , and x = f to denote that c 0 is filled w.r.t. B v .
Analysis of Cache Replacement Policies
Next we give a summary of our program-independent analysis of the absorption for each replacement policy.
Results for Filled Caches For some replacement policies, when the cache is filled and the footprint is small enough, some cache states are unreachable from the initial state, which reduces the information absorption. The details for each policy are given below. In case every state of the cache is reachable, we count all the possible feasible mappings of fp blocks to the set of ages A. Then the absorbed information is the number of k-permutations of n of the memory blocks, i.e., the number of different ordered arrangements of fp blocks in a sequence of up to A elements.
Proposition 1.
For M LRU , the absorbed information for a filled cache is:
Proof. Every cache state is reachable, even if starting from a filled cache. Since upon a hit the input block obtains age zero, any state can be reached simply accessing the target state's blocks from oldest to youngest, see (3) . Therefore, the absorbed information is the number of k-permutations of n of the available blocks. If fp < A, all the victim's blocks fit in the cache and the k-permutations of n are fp!. If fp ≥ A, we can only fit A blocks in the cache, which gives the value fp!/(fp − A)!.
⊓ ⊔ Proposition 2. For M FIFO , the absorbed information for a filled cache is:
Proof. An important property of FIFO is that it does not reorder cached blocks upon hits, see (2) . So, for fp ≤ A and a filled cache state, all the accesses are hits and leave the state in its original form.
When fp = A + 1 every reachable state contains all but one of the fp many blocks. For a set of blocks {b 1 , . . . , b A+1 } assume that the cache is initially in the following state:
where the leftmost element of the list has age zero and the one on the right is the oldest. An access to blocks b 1 , . . . , b A results in a hit and leaves the state as it is. The only way to change the state is by inputting b A+1 and causing a miss, which results in the following state: We proceed from oldest to youngest block of the target state. First we cycle the cache until the second youngest target block, b 2 , is evicted, we call this the stored block. After that we continue to cycle the cache but without using the stored block, so it is not updated into the cache until we want to. When the oldest target block, b 1 , is placed at the beginning of the cache, we input the stored block. This way we obtain the two oldest blocks of the target state in the target order b 2 , b 1 .
We cycle again until the third youngest target block, b 3 , is evicted and cycle again until the second youngest b 2 , is at the beginning. Then we access b 3 and obtain the three oldest blocks in the target order. We proceed in the same manner until the target state is reached. ⊓ ⊔ Proposition 3. For M PLRU , the absorbed information for a filled cache is:
Proof. Conceptually, PLRU maintains a binary tree with the blocks at the leaves and arrows on each non-leaf node pointing to one of the children, see Section 2.1. Since the initial state is filled, all the victim's blocks are stored in some leaves of the tree.
If fp ≤ A, all the inputs are going to produce hits, and the only update is a permutation of the ages which, in the tree representation, is the flipping of the arrows away from the input block. Then, the number of reachable states depends on how many of these arrows can point in more than one direction. An arrow may point in any direction if its children both have at least one victim's block that can be used to flip the arrow. So we we need to determine the number of non-leaf nodes where the two children have each at least one block.
Following the tree from root to leaves we can view the internal nodes with victim's blocks at the leaves reachable from both of its children as partitions of the set of victim's blocks into two subsets. This way, counting nodes with blocks in both children is equivalent to counting the number of partitions that can be performed until we obtain all singleton subsets. The amount of times we can partition a set of fp elements into two subsets until obtaining singleton subsets is fp −1, independently of how the partitions are done. Therefore, there are fp −1 arrows that may point to any direction. This produces 2 fp−1 reachable states. If fp > A we prove that every state is reachable from an initial one by inputting a sequence of blocks. For this we consider the target state as a tree with the blocks placed in specific leaves and the arrows in specific orientations. We divide the proof in two parts, first the case where the target blocks are already in the initial state and later when they are not.
If the blocks in the initial state are the same as in the target state, that is, if for every subtree of the initial state there is a subtree in the target state with the same blocks (not considering the arrows), we have a different permutation of ages between the two. What we need to do then is obtain the correct permutation of the ages by inputting a sequence of blocks. This can be done by using only the blocks in the state as we see now. We recall that, from the case above, when fp = A, the initial state has a victim block in every leaf. Therefore, there exists a sequence using only at most A blocks that reaches a state for every permutation of the arrows.
If the blocks in the initial state are not the same as in the target state, or if they are in wrong subtrees, we need to evict precise blocks from the tree and load them back in a different leaf in order to reach the target state. Again, since by only using blocks in the cache we can obtain any permutation of arrows, we can obtain a sequence that points the arrows to a specific block, evicts it and then modifies the arrows to load it back in a different leaf. Once the target blocks are in their corresponding leaves, we shift the arrows as before to obtain the target state.
⊓ ⊔
Results for Empty Caches
The case of an empty cache is more complex to analyze. First we need to explain a special behavior of PLRU that produces extra reachable states which increases its absorption with respect to the other two policies.
Example 1. Consider a 4-way cache that starts in a state consisting of the attacker's blocks {x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } ⊆ B a where we are going to access three victim blocks in a specific order, a, b, c ∈ B v . For any of the three replacement policies the state becomes:
where the leftmost element of the lists has age zero and the one on the right is the oldest. Consider that we now access The example is independent of the blocks being used but a consequence of the fact that we are inputting k < A blocks. For LRU and FIFO, any sequence using k < A victim blocks will transform an initial state [x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x A−1 ] to a state of the form [ , . . . , , x 0 , . . . , x A−1−k ], where victim blocks are denoted by " ". In the case of PLRU this is not always the case, as the previous example shows.
Following our definition of absorption, we assume that the victim may input any sequence of blocks. Then the number of reachable cache states can be determined as follows:
1. Determine the set of reachable configurations, i.e., cache states in which the victim's memory blocks are not distinguished from each other, but instead represented by the placeholder " ". 2. Determine for each configuration the number of concrete cache states the configuration represents, i.e., the number of ways the victim's blocks may fill its placeholders. This procedure can further be simplified upon by the following observation: The number of concrete cache states that a configuration represents, only depends on its number of placeholders and the number of victim blocks to consider: Given k placeholders and fp ≥ k victim's memory blocks, a configuration represents exactly fp! (fp−k)! cache states. Let Λ M (k, A) denote the number of reachable configurations under policy M , associativity A, with exactly k placeholders. Accessing fp distinct memory blocks may yield configurations with 0 to fp many placeholders. Based on this notion, we obtain the following general characterization of a replacement policy's absorption:
Proposition 4. For any replacement policy M , the absorbed information starting from an empty cache is:
Lemma 2. For LRU and FIFO, Λ M (k, A) = 1 for any number of placeholders k and associativity A. For PLRU, Λ MPLRU (k, A) is given by:
Proof. For LRU and FIFO, since they fill the cache placing k victim's blocks in the k youngest ages, there is only one possible configuration for each value of k. For PLRU we distinguish the three cases of k. If k = 1, there is only one block which is mapped to age 0. Repetitions of the same block do not modify the ages and so this is the only reachable configuration.
If k = A, the state is completely filled with placeholders and so it is the only reachable configuration.
If 1 < k < A, we use the representation of PLRU caches as trees with blocks on the leaves and arrows on the non-leaf nodes. We consider that we input any sequence of blocks that ends up with exactly k victim's blocks in the cache and study in which leaves these blocks can be. Note that we do not require the sequence to have exactly k different blocks but rather at least k. Extra blocks may evict other victim's blocks and still end up with k blocks in the cache.
We base the proof on the behavior of the root of the tree, its arrow and its two children. We study how different sequences of inputs affect them and use it to explain the elements of (8) . Since Λ MPLRU is constructed recursively, applying it to a child is equivalent to considering the child as tree on its own.
We first prove that any reachable state with exactly k victim's blocks (and consequently placeholders) has at least 1 placeholder in each child and at most A/2. The upper bound is trivial since it is the number of leaves in the child. For the lower bound consider the root of the tree. In the initial state the arrow points to one child. This child stores the first input b 1 of any sequence of victim's blocks, after which the arrow shifts to the other child. After this the sequence of inputs may have repetitions of b 1 , which have no effect on the state, before inputting a new block b 2 . Therefore, the child that does not store Then, the number of configurations with k placeholders depends on how many ways we can distribute them in the two children, constrained to at least 1 per child and at most A/2. This corresponds to the limits of the sum in (8); for each distribution of placeholders, we compute Λ MPLRU restricted to each child.
Finally, once a sequence has stored k victim's blocks in the state, the distribution of placeholders is fixed. However, the sequence may input repetitions of the blocks stored in the cache, which does not modify the number of placeholders but affects the arrow on the root, that shifts from one child to the other. There-fore, every distribution of placeholders accounts for two configurations, which produces the duplication in (8) .
Comparison of Absorption Let us compare the absorption of LRU, FIFO, and PLRU based on Propositions 1 to 4, for a cache set of associativity 4. Similar results can be obtained for any associativity. The results depicted in Figure 3 can be obtained both from the formulas above or by simulation of caches. We highlight the following observations. -For each replacement policy, the absorbed information grows monotonically with the footprint, as expected. -The absorption for an empty initial state is always larger than for a filled state. -For a filled initial state, LRU absorbs always at least as much information as the other replacement policies since every state is always reachable. For large enough footprints, the absorption coincides for all policies. -For an empty initial state PLRU absorbs most. This is due to the fact that PLRU may leave "holes" in the cache state, see Example 1. -For a filled initial cache, FIFO does not absorb any information, whenever the footprint is smaller than the associativity. This captures the intuition that preloading of sensitive data can increase security, as long as all data fits into the cache. In case it does not, the positive effect of preloading is, however, quickly undone. Figure 3a depicts the case of a filled initial cache, part 3b an empty one. In both figures, the horizontal axis depicts the footprint, i.e., the number of memory blocks used. The vertical axis depicts the absorbed information on a logarithmic scale, that is, in bits. Note that in Figure 3b , the line for LRU and FIFO coincides.
In this section we characterize the information extraction for different cache replacement policies. That is, we characterize ran(Z a ) from (5) . For this we develop a novel model that characterizes the information an adaptive attacker can learn about the initial state of a Mealy machine. We then use the model to derive bounds on the information that can be extracted from caches with different replacement policies.
Probing Strategies
Let M = (S, Σ, O, upd , view ) be a Mealy machine. A probe p of M is an alternating sequence p = σ 1 o 1 σ 2 . . . σ n o n of inputs σ i ∈ Σ a ⊆ Σ and observations o i ∈ O, such that M outputs o 1 . . . o i when the sequence σ 1 . . . σ i is the input. We say that a state s ∈ S is coherent with probe p if, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have
i.e., the probe does not exclude s as a potential initial state of M . Along the lines of [5, 12] , we define the adversary's knowledge set K(p) about the initial state of M as the subset of possible states that are coherent with probe p.
K(p) = {s ∈ S v | s is coherent with p}
For convenience, we also define the adversary's final knowledge set F K(p) as the set of states that M may be in after receiving the inputs and producing the outputs in the probe p:
An adversary may be able to choose inputs based on previous observations, that is, the probing can be adaptive. To model adaptivity we introduce probing strategies. A probing strategy is a function from a sequence of observations to an input symbol, att : O * → Σ a . This way, the first input to make comes from applying the function to the empty sequence, σ 1 = att(ε), the second input is a function of the previous observation, σ 2 = att(o 1 ), and so, for any i σ i = att(o 1 . . . o i−1 ). We say that p is a probe of att, if p may be obtained from the probing strategy att.
We now present a toy example that we will use through the section to illustrate the use of probing strategies.
Example 2. Consider a Mealy machine where S = S v = Σ a = {0, 1, . . . , 6}, the observation and transition function are:
Consider the probing strategy given by the function att(o 1 . . . o n ) = 0 + n i=1 o i , which starts by inputting 0 and determines the next input based on the previous outputs. We will later see that att is a good probing strategy in this example.
By definition, we can apply a probing strategy indefinitely on sequences of arbitrary length and thus probe the Mealy machine indefinitely. However, at some point additional inputs are of no use, as the following definition characterizes.
Definition 4. We say that a probe p = σ 1 o 1 σ 2 . . . σ n o n of probing strategy att is depleted w.r.t. to att, if for all probes q of att that are extensions of p, i.e., q = pσ n+1 o n+1 σ n+2 . . . σ m o m , the knowledge sets are equal, i.e., K(p) = K(q). We say a depleted probe p = σ 1 o 1 σ 2 . . . σ n o n is of minimal length when, a probe q made of a sub-sequence of it, q = σ k1 o k1 σ k2 . . . σ ki o ki for any i < n, is not depleted.
We next show that the knowledge sets of depleted probes of a probing strategy form a partition of the states of M . That is, the knowledge sets of distinct sequences are pairwise disjoint and their union contains all states.
Proposition 5. Given a probing strategy att, the set of all knowledge sets produced by depleted probes w.r.t. att
is a partition of the set of possible states S v .
Proof. We will first prove the following related statement: Let R att (i) be defined as follows:
We prove this statement by induction on i. Induction basis: For i = 0, R att (i) = {K(ǫ)}, and K(ǫ) = S v . So R att (i) is a trivial partition of S v . Induction step:
It is easy to see that for each probe p of
) is a refinement of R att (i) and thus also a partition of S v .
Let n be the length of the longest depleted probe of minimal length. Then R att = R att (n) as all probes considered in R att (n) must be depleted, and as extensions of depleted probes have the same knowledge set as their corresponding depleted probes of minimal length.
⊓ ⊔
Before starting the probing, the attacker knows that the victim's state is an element of the set S v . As he makes inputs and refines the knowledge sets, he reduces the number of coherent states and thus learns information about the victim's initial state. As depleted probes correspond to unrefinable knowledge sets, there is no point in further queries once a probe is depleted.
When constructing a strategy, the attacker needs to consider all the possible outputs that he might observe when eventually applying his strategy. Once all the knowledge sets obtained from an attack strategy cannot be further refined by additional queries, the probes are depleted and the attacker has along the way obtained the finest partition of the set S v under that strategy and all possible extensions. Example 3. Following Example 2 we apply the probing strategy to the set of possible states and obtain the partition shown in Table 1 . Each row shows the knowledge sets before and after the elements are updated (left and right, respectively). The first row shows the initial knowledge set, i.e., S v . The bold face 0 indicates the first input symbol, which partitions the initial knowledge set into two knowledge sets, corresponding to the two possible outputs of the Mealy machine on the input 0. For each resulting knowledge set, except for the singleton ones where the probes are depleted, the figure then indicates the next input following the probing strategy and how it partitions its knowledge set. After at most four inputs we obtain a partition of all singleton knowledge sets.
For every attack strategy there is a finite set of depleted probes of minimal length. We define Z a = Z att from (5) as the random variable that captures the sequence of observations obtained when following probing strategy att until obtaining a depleted probe of minimal length. So ran(Z att ) ⊆ O * is the set of sequences of observations obtained from the depleted probes of minimal length of att. Every depleted probe corresponds to a knowledge set; so we can relate every element of ran(Z att ) to a knowledge set. Therefore, computing | ran(Z att )| is equivalent to counting the number of knowledge sets in the partition induced by the strategy att.
Definition 5. We say that a strategy att is optimal if the partition R att it induces on a set of possible states S v , has the maximal number of knowledge sets among all strategies. We call this number r max the maximum information leakage.
The strategy presented in Example 2 is actually optimal since no partition can be better than the one that produces singleton knowledge sets. On the other hand, the strategy att(o 1 . . . o n ) = 1 + n i=1 o i is not optimal since the first input, 1, is not able to distinguish the initial states 0 and 1, which are both updated to 1 as a result of the input, upd 1 (0) = upd 1 (1) = 1, and so they can not be distinguished by this strategy.
Information Extraction in Caches
Here we derive bounds on the maximum information leakage for the three replacement policies. We prove bounds for LRU and FIFO based on the associativity of the cache and prove that for PLRU this bound depends also on the footprint.
Notation. Given a set of cache states C we use the following shortcuts:
Definition 6. We say that a set of cache states C has n ≤ A deterministic ages if all the states in C have the same n youngest blocks. That is, if there exists a sequence of blocks a 0 . . . a n−1 such that C(a i ) = {i} for all i ≤ n − 1.
Lemma 3. Let C be a set of cache states of associativity A and let p be a probe. We have that p is depleted if and only if F K(p) has A deterministic ages.
Proof. Since p is depleted we have that |F K(p)| = 1. Then F K(p) trivially has A deterministic ages.
If F K(p) has A deterministic ages, all the blocks are mapped to the same age for every state of F K(p) (either the deterministic ages or age A). This means that |(F K(p))| = 1 which implies that it is unrefinable and so p is depleted.
Lemma 4. Consider a set of cache states C of associativity A that uses either LRU or FIFO. Inputting a block mapped to a deterministic age has no effect on the number of deterministic ages.
Proof. Assume that C has n deterministic ages. Then there exists a sequence of blocks a 0 . . . a n−1 such that C(a i ) = {i} for all i ≤ n − 1. Any input with a block a j ∈ {a 0 , . . . , a n−1 } results in a hit. For LRU, following (3), the new ages are:
so the blocks a 0 . . . a n−1 are still mapped to the first n ages for all states which results in n deterministic ages. For FIFO, since hits do not reorder blocks (2), the conclusion is the same. Proof. We proceed by induction. When n = 0, upd b0 (C)(b 0 ) = 0; LRU places the block in the beginning for both hits (3) and misses (1) and FIFO does it for misses (1), by assumption this is the case for all inputs.
We assume the hypothesis is true for n and input b n+1 . This block is distinct from the previous ones so, by the induction hypothesis, upd b0...bn (c)(b n+1 ) > n for any c ∈ C, i.e. b n+1 is older than the previous. For FIFO its age is actually upd b0...bn (C)(b n+1 ) = {A}. Then b n+1 is placed at age zero, upd b0...bn+1 (C)(b n+1 ) = {0}, and the others increase their ages by one, upd b0...bn+1 (c)(b i ) = upd b0...bn (c)(b i )+ 1 = n + 1 − i for all c ∈ C and i ≤ n.
Assume now that we have a set of cache states C and we input a sequence b 0 . . . b k−1 with the requirements given in Lemma 5. Following this Lemma, upd b0...b k−1 (C) has k deterministic ages with a i = b k−1−i from Definition 6. Now consider that we extend the sequence of inputs with b k . . . b m with b i ∈ {b 0 , . . . , b k−1 } for k ≤ i ≤ m, that is, with blocks already mapped to deterministic ages. Then following Lemma 4 upd b0...bm (C) still has k deterministic ages.
If we continue to extend the sequence of inputs with new blocks (provided they produce misses for FIFO) we will produce extra deterministic ages on the updated set of states. If we extend with blocks already mapped to deterministic ages, the number of deterministic ages is not modified.
We consider two types of attackers in terms of their set of memory blocks. . . b n is formed with alternating sub-sequences of new blocks and repetitions of them, F K(p) = upd b1...bn (K(p)) has A deterministic ages which, by Lemma 3, means that p is depleted. Then any probe is depleted w.r.t. att if it has A different inputs. We now prove that, for any probe given by att, repetitions of inputs do not partition the knowledge sets. Given the non-depleted probe p = b 1 o 1 . . . b n o n , for any value of n, we have that a new input b produces |view b (F K(p))| = 1 if b = b i for some i ≤ n since b i is mapped to a deterministic age. For any other input, the view function is trivially bounded by 2,
Given the set of possible states S v , the first input given by att will produce at most two knowledge sets. For each of these knowledge sets, the second input will partition them into two knowledge sets, making a total of up to four knowledge sets, unless it is a repetition, in which case there is no partition. We can partition the knowledge sets further until the probes are depleted, which happens after A different inputs. Each not repeated input at most doubles the amount of knowledge sets so, after A inputs the strategy produces up to 2 A knowledge sets.
FIFO. Consider any given strategy att and any probe produced by att, p = b 1 o 1 . . . b n o n with n ≥ A and A misses. Following Lemmas 4 and 5, since b 1 . . . b n is formed with alternating sub-sequences of new blocks and repetitions of them, F K(p) has A deterministic ages which, by Lemma 3, means that p is depleted. Then any probe is depleted w.r.t. att if it has A misses.
Consider a non-depleted probe
, that is, obtaining a hit for all the states has no effect on the partition. An input b can return a hit for all the states in a final knowledge set in two cases:
1. The probe, starting from the last miss, is one of the form p = b 1 Mb 2 H . . . b n HbH with b = b i for some i ≤ n. 2. The input b is mapped to a deterministic age.
We now have a characterization of how depleted probes of minimal length look like. First, all depleted probes have A misses but may have a different number of hits between each miss. Second, in order for the probes to be of minimal length, their inputs do not return a hit for all the states in the current final knowledge set.
Since new misses introduce new deterministic ages, the maximum number of consecutive non-repetitive hits is reduced by one with each miss. Before any miss, att can produce up to A hits with these restrictions, which gives up to A+1 different probes. After the first miss, att extends each probe with up to A − 1 consecutive hits which makes up to (A + 1)A different probes. In the end, any attack strategy can produce up to (A + 1)! depleted probes of minimal length and the same amount of knowledge sets.
⊓ ⊔ Proposition 7. Consider M PLRU with associativity A ≥ 4 5 and a shared memory attacker. Let r max (fp) be the maximum information leakage obtained with a given footprint fp ≥ A. It holds that r max (fp + 1) ≥ r max (fp) + 1.
Proof. Let att be an attack strategy that obtains r max (fp) given a set of possible states. We are going to prove that one empty knowledge set from R att when using fp blocks is non-empty given an extra memory block i.e., when using fp +1 blocks.
Consider a probe where the first A − 1 observations are misses and the corresponding final knowledge set S 1 ; all the states in this set have the same blocks mapped to the younger ages and an unknown one in age A − 1 that we call b ′ . Consider the set of yet unused victim's blocks
v ; any input from that set evicts b ′ in the case of a miss. But before we input from B ′ v we input one previously-used block and update the states so that b ′ is mapped to age A − 2. We use the block in age 1 to modify the age of (4) . In order to do this, the associativity must be at least 4 so that A − 1 > 1.
After this, a new input from B ′ v does not evict b ′ in the case of a miss. Therefore, the input partitions S 1 into a knowledge set with b ′ and another knowledge set without b ′ but an unknown block in age A − 1. Repeating this process of placing the block from age A − 1 in age A − 2 and later inputting a new block allows to partition the knowledge set that returned a miss, without evicting an unknown block in the case of a miss, and therefore maximize the number of knowledge sets.
There is an attack strategy att that follows this process in order to obtain r max (fp). Then the knowledge set of the probe where all the observations are misses is empty. Now suppose that we have an extra memory block. Then, the knowledge set of the probe where all the observations are misses is not empty as it contains states with the extra block in age A − 1. This way we have increased the maximum information leakage by one.
In the case of associativity four for M PLRU the maximum information leakage is increased by eight with every new memory block, this can be seen in Figures  4e and 4f . This result also implies that the maximum information leakage for PLRU is unbounded.
Proposition 8. Consider M FIFO and M LRU with associativity A, and a disjoint memory attacker. The maximum information leakage on any set of states is bounded by A + 1.
Proof. We base the proof on the state of the cache before the victim accesses it. There are A attacker's blocks x 0 , . . . , x A−1 such that c(x i ) = i. Now we make use of the fact that for both, M FIFO and M LRU , for any block (2) and (3). This means that, when the attacker inputs one block he does not modify the ages of older ones. This is a way to probe the cache without evicting any blocks.
Assume the attacker inputs x 0 ; he gets a hit or a miss and partitions S v accordingly. The knowledge set that returned a miss has states with zero attacker's blocks, all inputs with attacker's blocks return the same output so it can not be partitioned further. The other knowledge set has at least one attacker's block and, following the property stated above, the older blocks, i.e. x 1 , x 2 , etc, have not been evicted. Now the attacker inputs x 1 and partitions the set into the states with exactly one attacker's block (x 0 ) and the ones with at least two.
Following this sequence x 0 , x 1 , . . ., every input singles out one unrefinable knowledge set but does not affect future inputs. In the end the attacker produces up to A + 1 knowledge sets.
⊓ ⊔ Proposition 9. Consider M PLRU with associativity A, footprint fp, and a disjoint memory attacker. The maximum information leakage is bounded by
Proof. The information extraction is intuitively bounded by the number of configurations of attacker's and victim's blocks that a disjoint-memory attacker can distinguish. For each value of k ∈ [0, fp], Λ MPLRU (k, A) gives the number of possible configurations using k victim's blocks, leaving A − k attacker's blocks. Therefore, by summing all of them up to the used footprint, we obtain the total number of configurations. Note that this bound may not be tight. ⊓ ⊔
An Algorithm for Information Extraction
In this section we present an algorithm for computing the maximum information leakage r max for a given Mealy machine. The algorithm complements Propositions 6 to 9 in that it can deliver r max for a specific set of states S v ⊆ S and an arbitrary Mealy machine. We use it later to compute extraction w.r.t. a given memory footprint, and to replace the engine for counting cache states in the CacheAudit static analyzer, leading to tighter bounds on the leakage. In principle, our algorithm enumerates all attack strategies att and computes their partitions R att by grouping states in S v according to the corresponding observations. Additionally, we use two techniques for improving efficiency and ensuring termination:
-First, instead of maintaining the knowledge sets K(p), for every probe p, we maintain the final knowledge set F K(p). Using the final knowledge set enables us to track the number of original knowledge sets, as required for computing leakage. At the same time it enables re-use of the computation leading to F K(p) across different strategies.
-Second, we need to identify cycles when refining partitions in order to ensure termination. We say that a probe q is redundant w.r.t another probe p, if F K(pq) = F K(p). That is, the probe q does not further refine the (final) knowledge set of p. The probe q represents a cycle, which we detect by keeping track of already visited final knowledge sets. The pseudocode is given in Algorithm 1. We next argue its correctness.
Proposition 10. Given a Mealy machine M = (S, Σ, O, upd , view ), Algorithm 1 terminates and finds the maximum information leakage r max for a set of possible states S v .
Proof. The algorithm recursively studies all the possible sequences of inputs. In every call, it cycles through all the inputs (line 7) and for each output of the observation function (line 17), partitions the set into final knowledge sets (line 18), updates every final knowledge set (line 19) and recursively calls again the function (line 20). Then, each execution obtains from the following calls the best way to partition the final knowledge set for each input (line 20), chooses the one with the maximum value (line 22), and returns it to the previous level (line 24). Our algorithm terminates if the number of knowledge sets is equal to the size of the set of possible states (line 8), at which point the knowledge sets cannot be further refined.
The flag sets S are used to keep track of the redundant sequences. Whenever an input does not partition the set (i.e. there is only one observation), it is saved (line 11). If a later call sees that the updated set S is equal to one saved in S then that call has produced a redundant sequence and so it is stopped with one final knowledge set (line 3). This procedure also guarantees that the algorithm terminates. If all the inputs that only produce one observation result in a redundant sequence, the algorithm is forced to choose one that partitions the set and eventually depletes the probes. Once a probe is depleted, the algorithm does not extend it anymore since every extension of a depleted probe is redundant. ⊓ ⊔ 6 Experimental Results
Extraction (Program-independent)
We use two alternative approaches for the program-independent evaluation of extraction properties cache replacement policies. The first is to rely on the upper bounds of Propositions 6 to 9. The second is to apply the algorithm presented in Section 5 to a set of states that represent the absorbed information for a given footprint. We determine that set for each cache replacement policy by a simple fixpoint computation. This algorithmic approach is more precise because it takes the absorbed information as a baseline, but it comes at the expense of higher computational cost. We obtain the following results by using Algorithm 1, where we consider a single 4-way cache set. Figure 4 depicts our data. We highlight the following results:
-For shared-memory adversaries, FIFO and LRU reach the bound on the maximum information leakage given in Proposition 6, which is independent of the footprint, see Figures 4a to 4d . In contrast, with PLRU the number of knowledge sets increases with the footprint as predicted by Proposition 7, see Figures 4e to 4f.
-For disjoint-memory adversaries and a filled initial state we always obtain zero leakage. For PLRU and a footprint of 2 or 3 some cache lines remain unoccupied. As before, these unoccupied lines trigger additional observations, which explain the bump in Figure 4e .
-We observe that FIFO exhibits the smallest difference between absorption and extraction among all policies, i.e. once absorbed, it is comparably easy to extract information from the cache, see Figures 4a to 4b. This is because FIFO does not reorder blocks upon hits, which makes systematic search for the cache state easier.
Extraction (Program-dependent)
We now use Algorithm 1 for computing the information that can be extracted from the cache state w.r.t. a specific program. For this, we use as a basis the set S v of states output by the CacheAudit static analyzer, when run on an implementation of AES 256. In this example we use a cache consisting of several independent cache sets of associativity 4, blocks of 64 bytes and overall sizes of 4, 8, and 16 KB. We consider two cases, one that starts from a filled cache and one that starts from an empty cache.
The full results are given in Figure 5 ; here we highlight the following results.
-We obtain the bounds on the absorbed information corresponds to using the CacheAudit static analyzer. The difference between the absorbed information and the extractable information corresponds to the precision gained by the development in this paper. This gain is generally higher when sets contain more blocks, and reaches up to 50 bits for LRU on a 4K cache with empty initial state and a shared memory attacker, see Figure 5d . That is, our extraction algorithm is a simple but powerful replacement for the model counting algorithms in CacheAudit.
-The figures show a change in slope at different points. This is due to the fact that the leakage about the full cache state is computed as the product of the leakages about the individual sets. When increasing the cache size for a fixed program, the footprint in each of the sets reduces. The combined effect of considering more sets with smaller footprint each accounts for the change in slope.
Related Work
Our work is related to existing models for adaptive probing [12, 7] . There, however, the secret remains static. The model of [12] and the deterministic part of [7] is a special case of ours, where the update function is the identity.
Mardziel et al. [16] develop an approach to quantify information flow for dynamic secrets, that is, secrets that evolve over time. They consider a probabilistic system and attacks that consist of a fixed amount of steps. Attacks finish with an exploit whose success is evaluated using gain functions [4] . Our model for information extraction differs from their model in that it is deterministic and allows to compute leakage for an undetermined number of attacks steps, i.e., until the probing is depleted. We further provide an algorithm that actually allows us to compute optimal strategies. We leave a probabilistic extension of our model to future work.
The problem that we consider in this paper is related to the state identification problem for Mealy machines, which was first introduced by Moore in [17] , expanded upon by Gill in [10] , and analyzed from a complexity perspective by Lee and Yannakakis [14] . The state-identification problem is to determine the initial state of a Mealy machine by probing strategies, just as in our case. While we are interested in the maximal number of knowledge sets into which the uncertainty about the initial state can be partitioned, state-identification algorithms are only concerned with the decision problem, that is whether or not a full identification, i.e, a partitioning into singleton knowledge sets is feasible, and if it is, by which strategy. So our problem of finding the finest partition can be seen as a quantitative generalization of the state-identification problem.
A proposal to quantify the security of cache memories was introduced in [25] . In this case, they use several types of attackers and study the security under different countermeasures, without considering the replacement policies individually. They obtained arguments in favor of some countermeasures against specific attacks. In our case we consider one single type of attacker, do not take into account any type of countermeasure and compare the different replacement policies.
Future Work and Conclusions
We presented a novel approach for quantifying isolation properties of shared caches, based on a simple model of adaptive attacks against Mealy machines. We use our approach for performing the first security analysis of common cache replacement policies (LRU, FIFO, PLRU), as well as for improving the precision of the CacheAudit static analyzer. Our prime target for future work is to , 5c and 5e depict the case of a filled initial cache, 5b, 5d and 5f an empty one. The horizontal axis depicts the size of the cache in KB, the vertical axis depicts the extracted information in logarithmic scale.
